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On the size of farsighted stable coalitions for international environmental agreements
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Abstract

The game theoretical analysis of international environmental problems has received increasing attention in recent years; in particular, the central questions are: under which conditions will an international environmental agreement (IEA) be ratified? Will the agreement be stable? Game theory has given different answers to these questions. In particular, it is possible to observe that if countries are farsighted in the sense of Chwe (1994), then both large and small stable coalitions can exist.
In this paper we extend to an arbitrary number of countries the results obtained by de Zeeuw (2005) for at most four countries. In particular, we focus on the grand coalition’s stability.

Keywords: International Environmental Agreements. Stable coalitions. Farsightedness.