New Approaches in Coalition Stability

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Quaderno n. 11/2009
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Abstract

In this paper we propose the state of art in the theory of coalitional games in effectiveness form without bargaining between coalitions. We study some solution concepts: The largest consistent set (Chwe, 1994); the largest cautious consistent set (Mauleon et al., 2004); the credible consistent set (Bhattacharya, 2002); standard stable behaviors (Xue, 1998). A series of examples, showing main features and differences between these solutions, are presented in order to outline some drawbacks and positive aspects in the philosophical framework of stability concepts.

keywords: coalitonal games; stable sets; farsightedness.
Jel Classification: C62; C71.

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